

~~about 1970~~  
POI. Capabilities

1. Take Hokkaido  
but not hold it.  
how vital wd. l.  
Korea be to successful  
invasion?

Sov. Ambitious left.  
How wd. change in  
Kor. war affect problem?

Pt. II - Intentions

defensive deployment in FE  
involv. in Korea  
East Jap inv. might cause  
gen. war.

In event of gen. war, <sup>in 1981</sup> wd. not invade.

Effect of reduction of US forces in FE on Sov.  
intentions and capab.

1. US strength for def. much will depend on
2. Sov. strength.
3. Evidence of intentions

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [ ]  
X DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS 5 C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: BR 700  
DATE: 3/13/81 BY: JEWEL: 000256

Rob of Korea - Sov. conquest of Korea wd. gthly  
facilitate inv. of Jap. permit 2-way primary  
permit use of Kor. and Chin. type etc. Line  
fund. air base.

Grounds for blvng. USSR wd. want Chi.Comm.

assistance. Chi. pent. might be in form of  
threats and diversions

CURRENT EDIT

emboss W air and naval forces drained  
away (for Europeans) (bad sit. in Jap. when  
Japs wake up) or heavy  
weighted capabilities subversive activities

crux of question is ability to maintain forces  
atomic bomb retaliation. Need to keep air  
strength back to defend bases

Intentions - Sovs. want to keep pot boiling  
in Korea; this inconsistent with "shift" to attack  
on Japan

possibly Kremlin mounting "cold war"  
threat to Jap, to divert W forces

bad weather, beaches.

Sov. war plans - all been off since  
age of disorientation in crisis

Routes Chin Comm

1. Sov. - Jap. - Korea - Kyushu

aggr. Kyushu they need Jap  
aggr. Honshu need Hokkaido  
across Sea of Jap.

probably must be aggr. Hokkaido

Surprise - wd. have to be surprise. How  
likely is this? All have to be aware of it

Assumption: W forces in FE will be roughly  
same as at present, incl. 2 US divs in Japan  
proper, plus x partially trained divs of Jap  
not. Korea.